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ABSTRACT 
The object of this research paper is to establish whether or not private and public 
interests in respect of negotiated settlements within statutory frameworks, such as 
those under the Human Rights Act 1993 and Privacy Act 1993, can be reconciled. 
I therefore examine the ideology and philosophy behind ADR and evaluate it in the 
context of both statutory bodies. I argue that the focus on dispute settlement and 
substantive outcomes under the respective legislation undermines the effectiveness 
of ADR as an alternative form of social reform. In particular, I submit that without 
jurisdictional principles for process choice and a transformative approach to 
mediation, the individualised and privatised nature of settlements within these 
statutory frameworks causes difficulty in reconciling both private and public 
interests. 
The paper concludes that the present approach to ADR, including mediation under 
consumer protection laws, creates a dilemma in reconciling private and public 
interests because it is constrained by legal norms rather than community norms. 
Once the latter are recognised as a legitimate challenge to legal formalism then 
private settlements may serve public ends and both private and public interests can 
be reconciled. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 13, 686 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the philosophy underlying alternative 
dispute resolution ("ADR") processes under consumer protection laws and to 
evaluate the use of ADR within two specific statutory frameworks, namely: that of 
the Human Rights Commission and the office of the Privacy Commissioner. In 
particular, the paper searches for answers to questions arising out of my 
observations of ADR practices within a statutory framework having worked in both 
statutory bodies. Those questions relate to the ad hoe manner in which ADR 
provisions are currently being utilised and the obsession with procurement of 
settlements rates in respect of complaints to either of the offices. 
The central thesis of this paper is to establish whether the private interests of 
individuals, in terms of negotiated settlements under consumer protection laws, can 
be reconciled with the public interests of our larger society. 
At first, a cursory examination of the objectives of ADR would lead us to believe 
that the two opposing interests are themselves in conflict. However, upon closer 
evaluation of the underlying philosophy of ADR in respect of consumer protection 
laws, it would appear that this need not necessarily be the case. The answer, it is 
submitted, lies in both identifying the philosophy of the practice of ADR in these 
institutions and then establishing jurisdictional principles for process choice so that 
both interests are reconciled. 
Accordingly, Part II of the paper provides the reader with background information 
concerning the ideology of ADR within a statutory framework, the goals of civil 
justice under consumer protection laws, the right of access to legal redress and the 
value of mediation of social conflict. 
Part III of the paper then broadly outlines in an informative way the approach taken 
to ADR provided by the State under the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Privacy 
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Act 1993, together with a synopsis of the decision making powers in those informal 
forums and the rationale relating to compliance without enforcement. 
Part IV highlights significant issues regarding procedural justice which relate to 
process choice, role conflict, fairness and confidentiality. 
P~ specifically addresses issues concerning settlement outcomes under the 
respective Acts in relation to disputants' choices, empowerment and recognition, 
and the dilemma of regulating ADR in terms of education, accountability and public 
policy. 
In concluding, I submit that the philosophy of ADR within a statutory framework 
should not merely be that of ensuring a "just settlement" but should ensure the 
validation of both disputants' perspectives and overlying public norms and values. 
This can be achieved by developing jurisdictional principles for "process" choice 
which are client-centred and by adopting a transformative approach to mediation 
which reflects empowerment and recognition and allows reconciliation of the 
disputants' perspectives with that of the larger social environment. 
In my view, it is time to move away from the problem-solving approach to ADR 
with its primary focus on dispute settlement. In particular, a transformative model 
of ADR permits a more realistic approach to disputes because it emphasises human 
relationships and allows disputants to take responsibility for both the process and 
any resolution that may result. However, a focus on reconciliation rather than 
settlement may also require a shift in public perception, namely towards 
reconciliation and away from resolution, before private and public interests can be 
reconciled and truly meet the objectives of the legislation. 
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II IDEOLOGY OF ADR 
This part of the paper sets out broadly the ideology behind the ADR movement in 
respect of the goal of civil justice that is central to the objectives of consumer 
protection laws. In particular, the rhetoric and reality of informalism and the 
protection of rights are examined to assess the effectiveness of ADR in relation to 
disputants and the dispute resolution movement as a whole. 
In this respect, Part II highlights important issues that are raised about the 
effectiveness of ADR especially questions regarding the policy grounds of utilising 
ADR processes for consumer rights. In doing so, I examine whether private 
substantive rights of consumers are reconcilable with public substantive rights 
enforceable by the State on behalf of the community. 
I believe that it is important that the ideology behind ADR is re-evaluated to 
determine whether or not the civil justice goal of "Jjghts protec~' is fulfilled 
under consumer protection laws and how ADR processes might assist in furthering 
such a goal. 
A. Ideology of lnformalism 
According to Harrington I the catalyst of judicial reform and improvement in the 
administration of justice was a result of early reforms based on sociological 
jurisprudence which was hostile to legal formalism. She stated that Pound argued 
that "legal formalism failed to produce agreements based on shared underlying 
values and therefore it encouraged the instrumental use of law."2 
C Harrington Shadow Justice: The ideology and lnstitutionalizalion of Alternatives to Court 
(Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1985). 
Above nl , 9. 
LAW LIBRARY 
V1CTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTO" 
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Despite early reform of the law favouring delegalisation of dispute processing, the 
reform was not considered a substitute but rather a move to complement the 
existing legal system to ensure a more balanced approach between formal and 
social justice.3 In particular, the previous legalistic procedures were idealised to 
become non-adversarial, rehabilitative and to be used in a preventive way to 
resolve conflict as a form of social construction.4 
It was argued that the legitimacy of the delegalisation reform was based on 
informal alternatives to the structured procedures characteristic oflegal formalism. 5 
Proliferation of ADR processes followed the early reform by adopting a thesis that 
the adversarial structure and adjudication function of the courts prohibited the 
effective resolution of party-related disputes.6 It is interesting to note how readily 
that ideology was accepted; yet without empirical examination of the efficacy of 
ADR as an alternative. 
New administrative institutional structures were created to implement informal 
dispute processing so transforming the previous judicial channels of access to 
justice. The aim was to enhance administration efficiencies but at the same ..____..... 
recognise that the "law would be a more effective socializing agent if citizens 
participated more directly in informal proceedings". 7 
Thereafter, alternative administration processes continued to grow because of an 
increasing use of administration litigation to deal with matters which previously 
had been addressed by private contractual negotiations. 8 Use of ADR processes 
appear to have increased following a reduction in private dispute processing 
historically provided by churches, schools and private associations.9 The new 
6 
7 
9 
Above nl, 10. 
Abovenl, 14. 
Above nl, 15. 
Abovenl,16. 
Above n I, 22; Below n34, 277. 
HH Perritt "Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of Negotiated 
Rulemaking and Other Processes" (1987) 14 Pepperdine L Rev 863,865. 
Above n I, 31; compare below n34,276. 
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processes included arbitration, fact finding and mediation which were thought to be 
more suited to "rights disputes" where disputants' conflicting interests required 
·1· 10 reconc1 mg. 
Harrington states that a proactive dispute process, which has the capacity to prevent 
and resolve conflict, is one of the main themes in the ideology behind the 
delegalisation reform. 11 She notes 12 that party-related disputes are complex and 
require a more flexible proactive decision making process to allow the disputants' 
role to be expanded in shaping both process and outcome, stating: 13 
The dispute-processing alternative substitutes the disputants · capacity for the 
court' s. The structure of mediation, distinguished from adjudication, enhances the 
capacity of disputants to reach a consensus on future behaviour, because it 
involves them more directly in the negotiation and the construction of a 
settlement. The structure of mediation is characterized as being a more congenial 
environment for expressing underlying issues in conflicts between related parties. 
The function of mediation, reformers maintain, facilitates the resolution of these 
conflicts by drawing on the sanctions and incentives within the disputants ' 
relationship . 
One of the stated objectives of ADR was to provide an alternative process outside 
of the formal system of justice that provided faster, cheaper and less formal access 
to legal redress for disputes typically of an interpersonal or neighbourhood variety 
although this now appears to have been extended to "rights". 
ADR processes, and in particular voluntary mediation, appear on the evidence to 
"make distinct contributions to the satisfactory administration of justice". 14 This is 
r 
evidenced by increased user satisfaction and achievements experienced by 
mediation clients.15 It seems that the core of the claim made for mediation is that 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Above n8 , 865 . 
Above n I, 32. 
Above n I, 30-31. 
Above nl , 32-33 . 
S Goldberg, E Green & F Sander Dispute Resolution (Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1985) see 
eh 13 , p 533 . 
Above n 14, 532. 
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agreements generated by mediation are perceived to be fair, equitable and complied 
with over time, while at the same time "permit a more complete airing of 
grievances and improve relationships between disputants". 16 
Harris suggests that the characteristics of an effective consumer dispute resolution 
process would be: informality, accessibility, ease of use, speedy resolution, 
minimum expense, procedural fairness, independence and impartiality together 
with ensuring compliance with outcomesj It is interesting to compare both the 
Human Rights Commission and the Privacy Commissioner's Office and note that 
each comply with the majority of the characteristics listed. 
In addition, Harris suggests that surveys indicate a high level of compliance with 
ADR outcomes. 18 However, there is also some evidence that enforceability of 
outcomes remains a problem in all ADR processes. 19 
While ADR processes are perceived to make the justice system more efficient, 
accessible and responsive to the needs of consumers by providing a forum which is 
less formal and intimidating, the protection of rights may be overlooked in the 
resolution of private differences. In some circumstances, the adversary process may 
be the better method for protection of particular rights in which case we need to 
reevaluate rights as social constructs. 
Alternatively, "rights" may be looked at as solely private possessions with no 
necessary public dimensions. If that is the case, we need to consider how the public 
interest might best be served by reviewing the policy that lies behind ADR within a 
statutory framework. This will largely depend on the underlying philosophy of 
ADR processes that are made available and the objectives of the disputants. 
Nevertheless, Harrington is of the view that when the exercise of rights becomes an 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Above n 14, 532-533. 
W Harris "Consumer Disputes And Alternative Dispute Resolution" ( I 993) 4 ADRJ 238, 240. 
Above n 17, 249. 
Above n17, 249. 
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expression of social problems then "rights are one context or framework in which 
social problem solving takes place".20 She states:2 1 
... substantive demands for social justice have been overshadowed by 
experimentation with techniques of alternative dispute resolution. This focus on 
dispute techniques has separated the politics of problem solving from the politics 
of taking rights seriously. ... Taking rights seriously can mean taking problem 
solving seriously. We need to tum our attention to the substantive rights and 
claims for justice that are expressed in the dispute-processing context. ... 
It is also argued that "[t]hough not without an ideology, ADR has never had a 
unified theory to explain what it accomplishes and how it works".22 Much 
descriptive analysis has, in recent years, been undertaken at a macroscopic level but 
few appear to have analysed where ADR fits in terms of the microscopic structure 
of a dispute. Conversely, there has been minimal macroscopic analysis of the 
jurisprudence of dispute resolution. 
B. Goals of Civil Justice 
It is apparent that ADR's central philosophy appears to be built upon the creation 
of trust between disputing parties. But what actually is a dispute? Lieberman 
suggests "a dispute arises only when the one against whom the complaint is lodged 
fails to respond satisfactorily to the aggrieved party. And a ' legal dispute' arises 
only when the claim is grounded in a legal entitlement".23 How then do disputes fit 
within the civil justice system? 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
Above nl , 173 . 
Above nl , 173 . 
JK Lieberman & JF Henry "Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement" 
( 1986) 53 U Chi L Rev 424 . 
Above n22 , 426. 
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Sherman 
24 
notes that there is a compelling need to improve the public image and 
quality of the civil justice system which has meant that the courts have had to 
dramatically change the way they function in order to regain public trust and 
confidence.
25 
This has required a shift in focus from that of changing the 
substantive law to actually improving the quality of the justice system overall.26 
In this regard, the aim of ADR should be to avoid separating out into "ideological 
camps over controversial policy issues such as adequacy of access to all citizens, ... 
and the wisdom of channelling more cases into alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR)".27 
Instead, I believe we must look at both process issues and the microscopic nature of 
each dispute. This should start with an evaluation of the micro context of a dispute, 
in terms of both the disputants' perspective's and the wider society, so that we 
understand how both private and public interests can be reconciled under consumer 
protection laws. 
First, however, it would appear that there are several societal goals underlying the 
debate in respect of civil justice reform and it is therefore necessary to determine 
where consumer disputes fit in, in the wider jurisprudential sense. The goals of 
civil justice have been identified to include: resource allocation, social justice, 
fundamental rights protection, public order, human relations, legitimacy and 
administration.28 It is the goal of "rights protection" which I wish to address 
specifically in this paper. 
Individual protection of fundamental rights within the civil justice system has been 
considered a prime goal of New Zealand in recent years and this is exemplified by 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
EF Sherman "A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States" (1994) 46 
Stan L Rev 1553. 
Above n24, 1554; see footnote no 3. 
Above n24, 1558-1559. 
Above n24, 1559. 
RAB Bush "Dispute Resolution Alternatives And The Goals Of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional 
Principles For Process Choice" 1984 Wise L Rev 893, 908. 
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the number of statutory laws that have been enacted including the Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 1993. Bush describes the goal of "rights protection" 
thus:29 
... a concern for the integrity of the individual person, the desire to protect against 
any kind of action that seriously denigrates or devalues the significance of an 
individual human being as such. The preservation of the individual's unique 
value is seen as the very foundation of the social enterprise. . .. the preservation of 
what are seen as the basic conditions to which social organization must adhere in 
order to be justifiable. 
While the protection of rights is important and often commensurate with other 
goals of our civil justice system, it is the violation of those individual rights which 
is highly significant in that express recognition of such rights may prevent future 
violations. ADR lends itself to the goal of rights protection because it allows the 
parties to a dispute to become directly involved in the resolution of that dispute by 
promoting a focus that is both outcome and process orientated unlike some other 
civil justice goals which are dependent on outcomes or results.30 But informal 
resolution need not depend on the vindication of rights - although it may allow 
parties to clarify the nature of the dispute which is perceived as a challenge to those 
rights. 
It is sometimes argued that the use of ADR in respect of the goal of rights 
protection is inappropriate because ADR fails to recognise and articulate the 
violation in a way that can set a precedent for future reference. 
This argument focuses simply on outcome and fails to take into account the value 
of the parties' involvement in ADR processes whereby hands-on dispute handling 
also assists in furthering the other civil justice goals such as human relations, social 
justice and public order. The goal of legitimacy is also likely to be furthered where 
dispute handling is seen as "meriting social assistance" in a manner that is fair and 
29 
30 
Above n28, 913. 
Above n28, 914. 
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even handed.31 The criticism also ignores the interdependence of the goals of the 
civil justice system and the fact that they are intrinsically linked to each other. 
So if the civil justice goal of consumer protection laws is the protection of 
individual rights how does ADR and the ideology of informalism promote this? 
C. Access to Legal Redress 
There is little doubt that it is in the interests of consumers to have an effective and 
accessible means of resolving disputes and enforcing rights. 
Harris suggests that both the ~ sts and f~lity of traditional litigation deters 
consumers from exercising their legal rights and favours the larger party who is 
already knowledgable and familiar with court procedures and is also more easily 
able to meet the costs of litigation.32 Others note that ADR also has the potential to 
serve the interests of the more powerful party against the disadvantaged party 
because it deters large scale structural changes in political and societal institutions 
which formal adjudication can do.33 
The criticism of Abel34 in particular, is that informal institutions, which it is 
submitted would include statutory bodies such as the Human Rights Commission 
and office of the Privacy Commissioner, neutralise conflict that might otherwise 
threaten capital or the state thereby perpetuating the status quo.35 This occurs 
because informal institutions "[respond] to grievances in ways that inhibit their 
transformation into serious challenges to the domination of state and capital".36 As 
a result, the institutions are ultimately controlled by respondents in that the process 
allows the "[forestalling of] public sympathy by satisfying claims through payment 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Above n28, 919 . 
Above nl7, 239. 
Above nl4, 534. 
RL Abel (ed) The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press Inc, New York, 1982) see 
Volume 1 eh 10 "The Contradictions of Informal Justice" 267 . 
Above n34, 280. 
Above n34, 280 . 
C 
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of small, predictable amounts".37 In other words, the potential for modifying 
behaviour as a form of social ordering is transformed into a simple monetary 
claim.38 Accordingly, informal institutions end up processing only those matters 
which do not challenge the basic structure of society.39 The rationale behind their 
approach appears to be that as the conflict results from misunderstandings that arise 
through poor communications, the role of informal institutions is an expressive 
rather than instrumental one.40 
Abel also argues that informal institutions not only confine their jurisdiction 
41 but they also: 
... shape conflict by scapegoating the exceptional enterprise that is totally 
irresponsible, thereby diverting attention from routine business practices and 
ensuring that regulation and publicity will have only a very limited general 
deterrent effect. ... Informal institutions thus collapse the political into the 
personal... 
In reality, informal institutions neutralise conflict by essentially individualising the 
dispute within a private context. The privatisation of the dispute precludes public 
redress because the informal institutions do not name respondents who are the 
subject of those complaints. 42 
However, while ADR ideally provides processes that are easy for consumers to 
initiate and use, an aspect seen in the past as an inherent failure of the traditional 
legal system especially for disputes that involved small amounts of money, it has 
not encouraged legal redress on a structural level. Nevertheless, the availability of 
ADR processes for consumer disputes are realistic alternatives to the traditional 
court processes for although " [t]hey do not increase the accessibility of the ordinary 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Above n34, 281 . 
Above n34, 282 . 
Above n34, 283. 
Above n34, 284 . 
Above n34 , 287; 288. 
Above n34, 292. 
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courts to the consumer [they] do increase the consumer' s access to justice in a 
b d 
,, 43 
roa er sense . 
In providing more accessible legal redress for the protection of individual rights, 
through ADR processes, one should always be mindful that this may result in some 
disputes being screened out of the courts where judicial intervention might well 
have been the most effective way to resolve the conflict.44 
Despite this, it would appear that certain types of societal harm have not previously 
been accorded a legal remedy (privacy interests and non-discriminatory rights to 
equal treatment) and with societal recognition of these fundamental harms and 
corresponding legal rights, there has been growing acceptance of gaps in the 
enforcement of those rights. 
45 
The effort to encourage individuals to enforce fundamental rights has required 
reformers to devise alternative means of access to the law to enable enforcement of 
rights created by the new laws. Procedural informalism was seen as one means of 
implementing the substantive rights, by virtue of its perceived accessibility, less 
threatening environment and speedy resolution or settlement without recourse to 
the more formal legal avenues offered through the courts. It seems procedural 
informalism, in respect of the protection of rights, stemmed largely from the 
"possibilities of achieving social change by making rights effective".46 
Mediation and conciliation have largely been the ADR processes most favoured 
under consumer protection laws. Conciliation probably more so, despite some 
proponents suggesting it tends to undermine the enforcement of rights.47 However, 
conciliation' s acceptance appears to be politically uncontroversial in that the 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Above nl7, 250. 
Above nl4, 6. 
Above n34, see Volume 2 eh 7 B Garth "The Movement toward Procedural Informalism in 
North America and Western Europe: A Critical Survey" 183, 188. 
Above n34; n45 , I 92 . 
Above n34; n45 , 193 . 
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process itself is low cost and encourages social harmony.48 It also appears to 
promote the ideals of restorative justice, as an added incentive, in allowing 
individuals to vindicate their rights by means of a conciliated settlement rather than 
having to proceed through the more costly and formal court procedures. 
It is submitted that there may be disadvantages in promoting and emphasising 
conciliation as an ADR process to make rights effective. This is because the focus 
of conciliation is to reach settlements or outcomes which emphasise the legal rights 
of the disputants rather than the nature of the relationships between them. 
Moreover, the outcome can be influenced by the conciliator' s interpretation of the 
law which could be perceived to benefit the larger party who generally has access 
to more knowledge about legal rights.49 Access to legal redress in the form of 
conciliation may not, in reality, be that different in terms of outcome than a 
decision reached in the ordinary courts in that it produces similar party 
dissatisfaction because of the win-lose result. 
This raises the question of what 1s the philosophy underlying ADR provisions 
under consumer protection laws. 
Conciliation as an ADR process may be of little value to some disputants because it 
may ultimately result in little change to the status quo. In effect, the goal of social 
change becomes largely symbolic in that the emphasis on rights is simply one of 
non-adversary legal advice. In practice, civil justice reform of the protection of 
rights reflects alternative access to a legal resolution rather than a contractual 
solution and/or agreement between the parties to the dispute. 
In this respect, the reform fails to acknowledge the diversity of public norms and 
values. If the State' s role is to provide an alternative forum for the enforcement of 
rights so as to avoid social disruption by reacting to disputants ' " legal needs" then 
this reduces the chance of promoting social change because it only validates an 
48 
49 
Above n34 ; n45, 196; 197. 
Above n34; n45, 198. 
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individual's substantive rights. 50 It also may serve to reinforce dependence on the 
State, as a specific economic or political structure, for the vindication of rights. 
The other problem with conciliation is that it assumes that the private "needs" of 
disputants are satisfied by achieving an outcome or end result. While this might be 
true for some it is not necessarily the objective of many complainants who often 
wish for their complaint to be acknowledged so that the same thing does not 
happen to someone else. It is submitted that this endorsement of public values and 
norms is where mediation of social conflict is most appropriate. 
D. Mediation of Social Conflict 
For many consumers, traditional legal redress for resolving disputes has been 
inadequate in that the legal system has seldom been "responsive .. . to issues that 
affect the quality of everyday life".51 
More particularly, small unresolved problems in terms of the law, often influence 
the attitudes of people about law and order more generally.52 Despite complaint 
mechanisms being available complainants are still reluctant to pursue disputes 
under consumer protection laws. It seems that this is due in part to the perceived 
"improbability of success".53 In particular, many complaint systems do not prevent 
or always deter future abuses and only satisfy some isolated individuals. Why is 
this? 
It may have much to do with the social organisation of the societal group in which 
the complainant is a member. For example, Felstiner 54 describes two ideal types 
of social organisation: the technological complex rich society ("TCRS") and the 
50 
5 1 
52 
53 
Aboven34; n45 , 206. 
L Nader " Disputing Without the Force of Law" (1979) 88 Yale LJ 998, 1001. 
Above n51, I 002. 
Above n51 , 1007. 
WLF Felstiner ' Influences Of Social Organization On Dispute Processing" ( 1974) 9 Law & 
Soc Rev 63 . 
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technological simple poor society ("TSPS"). He is of the view that the former is 
less concerned with interpersonal relationships that the latter. 55 Accordingly, the 
form of dispute processing utilised by complainants differs according to the type of 
social organisation of which they are a member. 
A distinction occurs between self-assertion of individual interests and the 
importance of group values or prevention of future behaviours. In particular, where 
group values are important then avoidance as a technique is more likely to be used 
as a form of dispute processing. Avoidance, however, appears more difficult for 
outsiders to recognise and consequently, is infrequently reported.56 But with this 
technique come variable costs which may account for why some complainants do 
or do not utilise consumer dispute processes offered within a statutory framework. 
This it seems is because, in reacting to disputes, avoidance may not carry such a 
high cost as it might if interests other than that out of which the dispute rose were 
jeopardised, for example, a dispute which centres around a single interest such as 
self-assertion of an individual's right to privacy. Whereas: 57 
... [A]voidance has high costs in a TSPS and one would as a result expect 
significant use of other forms of dispute processing which are more likely to aid 
the maintenance of threatened, but important, social relationships. 
In terms of consumer complaints, complainants appear to avoid a dispute by 
refusing to take any action in respect of it even though the dispute is neither 
resolved or acknowledged nor interaction between the individual complainant and 
respondent altered. 58 Where this occurs it is probable that the complainant views 
mediation as being futile because of the discrepancy in the size and power of the 
respondent organisation.59 A good illustration of this would be cases of sexual 
harassment in employment. Sexual harassment is frequently ignored, at least 
initially, by those subject to such behaviour. On the other hand, this may also have 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Above n54 , 65. 
WLF Felstiner "Avoidance As Dispute Processing: An Elaboration" ( 1975) 9 Law & Soc Rev 
695; above n54 , 76. 
Above n54 , 80. 
Above n54, 81 . 
Above n54 , 81. 
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something to do with a lack of knowledge of the avenues of redress available to the 
harassed person. 
It is submitted that the reluctance of consumers to complain to third parties may 
also stem from either a lack of knowledge or a disenchantment with ADR processes 
that are presently offered within statutory frameworks. Consequently, most ADR 
provisions appear under utilised because they are not consumer-centred. In 
addition, the expectations of consumers means that they are inevitably disappointed 
in the actual provision of ADR services as complaints officers often can, and do, 
reinforce existing inequalities by responding to "interests" which differ to those of 
l · 60 comp amants. 
This happens, in my view, predominantly because the complaint officers are 
constrained by the narrow parameters imposed by the consumer statutes. While 
disputing parties are encouraged to find creative solutions to the problem that 
caused their dispute, the problem-solving approach in mediation is too narrow. 
Although disputants' interests are identified, success is nevertheless measured by 
the final outcome or result. The existence of a third party, whose function is to 
separate the problem from the people, is not dissimilar to the adversarial approach 
taken in the courts except that mediation is conducted privately. 
Mediation as a process is aimed at building trust between disputants so allowing 
them to explore workable relationships. Otherwise, "any truncated attempted at 
settlement would inevitably be deficient with regard to process and flawed with 
regard to outcome" according to Durbach, who quotes the following: 61 
60 
61 
'The ethical dilemma that faces mediators working in a number of different areas 
is how to maintain the integrity of the mediation process ... without letting the 
process be used to violate important interests of the community.' 
Above n51, 1008. 
A Durbach "Test Case Mediation - Privatising The Public Interest" ( 1995) 6 ADRJ 233, 241; 
see footnote no 11 for source of quotation. 
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If parties lose control of both the dispute and reconciliation process then the 
capacity to advance the public interest diminishes. 62 
The mediation of social conflict, in terms of protection of consumer rights, involves 
much more than simple problem-solving. In essence, it is more than an alternative 
to equity through the courts. It involves a contractual arrangement between the 
disputing parties which modifies future behaviour. It is acknowledged that without 
statistical aggregated complaint data there is little pressure on system reform or 
changes in public norms and, as a result, complainants may remain dissatisfied with 
the process and/or outcome. It therefore seems unlikely that consumer legislation 
will vindicate disputants ' rights fully until rights are conceptualised as collective 
harms. 
While voluntary mediation is often concerned with substantive rights, the process is 
also conceptually broader than simply an alternative process to litigation. It 
involves a linear relationship where the parties contractually agree to participate as 
a step towards understanding and exchanging views in the hope of reconciling their 
differences. 63 
Perhaps the theory which best describes what the practice of mediation ought to be 
under consumer protection laws is that which Folger and Bush 64describe as the 
transformative approach. A transformative approach to mediation entails assisting 
the disputants to better understand one another' s perspective so enhancing 
opportunities for moral growth by allowing them to take responsibility for their 
actions that gave rise to the dispute . "[I]t is as much about changing people as it is 
about resolving disputes".65 The emphasis is not merely on settlement but on 
recognition and empowerment within human interactions. It is conceptually 
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different to the "directive, settlement-orientated practice [ of problem-solving] that 
focuses on defining problems and producing solutions". 66 
Recognition of others ' perspectives goes beyond the immediate dispute to the on-
going lives of the parties themselves - " [t]he parties ' goals and choices are treated 
as central at all levels of decision making". 67 
The mediator' s role then becomes one of enhancing party interaction so that 
disputants define and resolve their differences themselves. The experience of the 
mediation process, while not necessarily resulting in a settlement, permits the 
disputants rather than the mediator to articulate and reflect their concerns and 
decisions.68 It encourages parties ' deliberation and choice making and seeks to 
avoid the mediator from "making any global assessment of what the dispute as a 
whole is about" . 69 
This is not only a reframing of mediation but also a reframing of consumer disputes 
- recognising that these too are about relationships, recognition, empowerment and 
not merely resolution. 
Such an approach moves away from disputants ' private self-interests because the 
conflict provides an opportunity for disputants to interact in a way that reinforces 
and recognises the other' s perspectives. The value of mediation is not in defining 
the problem but actually in the interaction that takes place between the disputants. 70 
I will now broadly outline both the approach and alternative dispute resolution 
processes currently provided by the Human Rights Commission and the office of 
the Privacy Commissioner. 
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Ill INSTITUTIONALISATION OF ADR 
A. ADR Under Consumer Protection Laws 
Both the Human Right Commission and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
carry out their functions pursuant to the enactments under which they are created. 
The statutes provide both formal and informal processes to resolve disputants ' 
conflicts. In particular, impartial third parties are involved mainly in the process of 
fact finding, facilitation, conciliation and less often, in a mediation role, either in 
combination or as an aside to the distinct although sometimes complementary 
processes. 
In practice, the pnmary process utilised is the process of investigation of a 
complainant's allegations and if, subsequently, those allegations appear to have 
substance, to attempt resolution through either mediation or conciliation. The 
Commission and Privacy Commissioner also both have powers to compel the 
disputant parties to attend a conciliation conference. 71 If a complaint is found to 
lack substance, or mediation or conciliation breaks down, there is provision for the 
matter to be referred to the Complaints Review Tribunal.72 The disputant parties, 
however, usually have little real choice as to the process that is adopted, although 
in the early stages of the investigation conducted by the Human Rights 
Commission, a preference is offered between two options (investigation or 
mediation). 
There is no systematic analysis made by the third party as to which options might 
best reflect the parties ' objectives in terms of both outcome and process. The 
complainants only real choices are either withdrawal or, if the complaint lacks 
71 
72 
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substance or conciliation fails, to request a referral of the complaint to the 
Complaints Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). 73 
B. Decision Making in Informal Forums 
It is submitted that in understanding how ADR might ensure that both private and 
public interests can be reconciled under consumers protection laws, we need to 
consider whether ADR provisions in the legislation are intended to facilitate 
administrative settlements as an adjunct to the court system or whether ADR is 
intended to facilitate the resolution of disputes on a contractual basis outside of the 
legal framework. 
The distinction is important because of the ramifications in terms of decision 
making. ADR within a statutory framework cannot have been enacted simply to 
satisfy private interests. The legislation is intended to regulate people' s behaviour 
and acknowledge the protection of certain fundamental rights. 
I suspect that ADR under the Human Rights Act 1993 and Privacy Act 1993 was 
primarily intended to operate as an adjunct to the traditional court system. This is 
supported by the practices that have evolved within the two statutory organisations 
in that the investigation process is usually followed by conciliation and/or an 
"opinion" by a third party. Having established whose legal rights prevail, the 
disputants may then settle or the matter may proceed on to the Tribunal. 
However, it is suggested that " [i]nexpensive, expeditious, and informal 
adjudication is not always synonymous with/air andjust adjudication".74 In fact, 
where the decision makers do not understand the values at stake, any deficiencies in 
73 
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informal processes can result in "nothing more than inexpensive and ill-informed 
decisions" reflecting existing power structures within our society. 75 
On the other hand, it is argued that fundamental substantive public interests will not 
be enforced by processes that encourage disputants to "understand" each other.76 
In my view, this overlooks the importance of managing conflict by modifying 
behaviour. While decisions made by third parties may resolve specific problems 
they rarely prevent future occurrences of similar behaviour because there is no 
educative component built in to the process. If disputants learn to interact better 
with each other through ADR processes then they are more likely to take 
responsibility for any decision making that eventuates. 
It is also argued that "whenever an ADR decision facilitator lacks a clear legal 
standard, impartiality may be more difficult to attain". 77 As a result, decision 
makers' impartiality, the hallmark of ADR facilitators, is more difficult to evaluate 
and disputants' confidence in the processes is lessened. 78 
While it is acknowledged that disputing is simply another mode of decision 
making79 it is evident that some obviously believe that the lack of an authority 
figure to determine the dispute can impair the quality or accuracy of the result80 as 
well as causing other problems such as credibility. For example, it is suggested 
that disputes which the public perceive to be important require decisions made by 
figures of public repute. Such disputes might include those in which the law enacts 
general consumer enforcement schemes, for example, consumer protection laws. 
It is submitted that leaving decision making to either an impartial third party or the 
disputants is a matter that should be governed by the jurisdictional principles 
75 
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related to process choice rather than the State. In any event, matters considered of 
substantive public value can be publicised if need be by aggregating complaint data 
to ensure the "guidance function of the law". 81 Moreover, I do not believe that it is 
helpful to equate procedural shortcomings with substantive shortcomings in that 
this could underestimate the decision making attributes of transformative 
mediation. 
C. Compliance without Enforcement 
If disputants become directly involved in both the process and resolution of their 
disputes it is possible that the resulting interpersonal ties could become effective 
mechanisms of social control. 82 In such situations the disputants actually "fashion 
their own norms and will be engaged in the productive enterprises of private 
ordering".83 Compliance therefore occurs without enforcement or the sanctions of 
the law. 
In reality, mediation can protect the public values at stake, provided the mediator 
remains an outsider to the dispute, 84 by conceptualising problems into opportunities 
for disputants to interact and learn about themselves and arrive at resolutions not 
possible in other forums. 85 
Brunet accepts that disputants often have similar incentives to resolve disputes 
together with information necessary to understand and evaluate the dispute in order 
h l · 86 to reac a proper reso ut1on. 
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It is claimed that ADR outcomes, and in particular mediated settlements, are rarely 
authored directly by a third party and accordingly, disputants "may be able to avoid 
the impact of the policies underlying the substantive law".87 As a result, mediated 
outcomes may be significantly different from litigation because public values 
support substantive legal norms which are result directed. 88 This has caused a 
degree of criticism but, in my view, is premised on outcome values only. 
According to Brunet, any signal arising from ADR that "outcomes dictated by 
substantive law are unworthy of enforcement" is probably less significant where 
ADR outcomes are "private" ones. 89 
If it is accepted that the rejection of legal norms in the ADR context can lead to 
creative solutions in individual cases, there is no reason why this should not benefit 
the public interests of society as "there is no universal need to draft and publicise 
all positive law to reach all citizens" .90 Brunet claims this view is supported by 
Fuller who believes that citizens learn of the law through cultural habits of 
patterned behaviour rather than reading case-law.9 1 Indeed, of the many civil 
disputes which are filed in the courts most are settled privately without any case-
law resulting. 
ADR and particularly mediation are concerned primarily with valuative norms 
rather than legal norms. This suggests to me that disputants are not compelled to 
reach solutions that are directed by substantive law. 
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IV PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
A. Jurisdictional Principles 
It would appear from my observations that the statutory alternative dispute 
resolution provisions under both the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 
1993 are utilised in an ad hoe fashion and require jurisdictional principles for 
process choice. At present the ADR provisions under those two Acts are used 
neither effectively or efficiently. Public consumer dispute handling bodies must 
encourage process choice that not only reflects the interests of the disputing parties 
but also the larger society of which they are part. 
Professor Bush 92 argues that the goals of society in any civil justice system are 
multiple and that for alternative dispute resolution processes to be effective they 
must be selected by evaluative criteria and jurisdictional principles, particularly in 
respect of process choice, with "due attention to the entire complex of civil justice 
goals".93 In other words, principles guiding the use of dispute handling alternatives 
should be the goals of the civil justice system itself. 
He suggests that advocates of the goal of "rights protection" in the civil justice 
system focus on two general rights: outcome rights which refer to the rights of 
individuals to certain treatment by others outside of the dispute handling processes; 
and process rights which are rights of individuals to certain treatment by others 
within the dispute handling processes.
94 
In this respect, the dispute handling alternatives within the civil justice system not 
only monitor outcomes of individual violations of fundamental rights but also 
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protect process rights when an outside party such as the State, has a role to play in 
individual dispute resolution. 95 
It is the process rights with which I am concerned. Any furthering of the goal of 
protection of fundamental rights within statutory bodies such as the Human Rights 
Commission and Privacy Commissioner's Office requires more than simply the 
upholding of outcome-orientated rights but ·in addition, requires protection of 
process-orientated rights. 
It is noted that the other goals of social justice in the civil justice system, such as 
preserving human relations,96 depend "not so much on the outcome of the dispute 
handling process, ... but rather on the parties' experience in the process itself'.97 In 
effect, the process of handling disputes can have a significant impact on the goals 
of ordering human relations, including improving them, because it does not rely on 
the use of decision criteria.98 
In Bush's view, process pluralism is not goal pluralism and "without a framework 
that forces a multi-goal focus"99 the difficulties of goal competition may become an 
issue for both parties. 
This is compounded by the absence of any jurisdictional principles as to what type 
of process is needed to further the differing goals. Bush believes that there has 
been no thorough theoretical justification for the pluralism approach. 100 He 
suggests that the crucial question in using dispute handling alternatives is which 
. h" h f 101 process to use m w 1c type o case. Previous discourse has argued that 
different types of cases require different processes, however, the real issue is which 
. h" h 102 case reqmres w 1c process. 
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If disputants are able to identify the civil justice goals they seek, then a link can be 
made to the factors which match cases to processes. The general characteristics of 
each alternative dispute process ("process factors") need to be determined and 
"enumerated with reference to all of the civil justice goals" identified. 103 Such an 
exercise will be analytical rather than descriptive. 
Once the disputants have identified the goals of civil justice they seek in any 
particular case, the process factors can be analysed as to which are relevant to those 
goals. The specific process can then be determined by reference to the significant 
process factors. 
It is submitted that both the Human Rights Commission and the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner must give urgent consideration to ensuring process choice 
for disputants if the objectives of the respective Acts are to be fully effective. At 
present, the primary focus of processes utilised concern outcome rights and there is 
very little recognition that process rights are valued. 
B. Process Choice 
If process choice is not recognised, and therefore not valued, then disputants and 
even third parties themselves become confused about the role of the alternative 
processes. In particular, there are many misconceptions as to what alternative 
dispute processes actually involve and what there likely effects will be. This is 
exemplified in the statutory bodies above, where impartial third party officers are 
employed as investigators and subsequently, are expected to mediate or conciliate 
disputes. This is expected despite some officers having no detailed knowledge 
and/or experience of the salient process factors of a given process or which process 
factors are important in terms of the disputing parties' interests and society's goals 
in respect of civil justice. 
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In particular, the investigation process is largely assumed to revolve around both 
legal rules and procedural protocols. However, the process employed is not 
expressly regulated by the Statute but left to the statutory body to implement as it 
thinks fit. 
The process also operates without jurisdictional principles or strict protocols. 
Accordingly, the process can produce unreal expectations, distorted inter-party 
communications and frequently , dissatisfaction. The third party officers can also 
influence which process is utilised either subconsciously or consciously because of 
process bias. Bias can also arise from the parties ' preconceptions about the process 
itself. 104 
For example, there are common misconceptions as to what the mediation process 
involves, namely, that mediation lacks rules, sanctions, formal direction and order. 
Often the informality of the process carries with it an increased risk of prejudice in 
that a mediator may have initially been the investigator or be more comfortable 
with one particular process. The risk of prejudice can be heightened in disputes 
concerning intimate areas of life particularly if the parties are of unequal status or 
of a particular disposition in terms of moral norms, group or class.105 
Of course, such risks can be greatly reduced simply by ensuring that the third party 
and disputants are aware of the process, what it involves and what the parties can 
expect out of it. The risks can also be largely ameliorated by identifying the goals 
of disputants early on and selecting the process of their choice which then has its 
own inbuilt checks and formalities. 106 This will require evaluation of the extent to 
which party goals are acknowledged and possible within statutory goals of the 
respective legislation. 
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Conciliation is also misunderstood in terms of its process and expectations. It is 
often asswned that because conciliation is informal, consensual and without rules, 
. . l . d d. bl 107 1t mvo ves an uncertam an unpre 1cta e process. 
In most complaints under the Hwnan Rights Act 1993 and Privacy Act 1993 the 
ultimate outcome, following investigation and conciliation, reflects the legal rules 
of the legislation. The process does ensure some knowledge on the part of the 
parties in respect of the procedure, law, tribunal involvement and type of possible 
settlement options. 
Unfortunately, misconceptions relating to the different statutory processes abound 
and the roles of the complaint officers concerned are seldom understood by the 
disputants. This causes confusion and inevitable dissatisfaction in terms of both 
the outcome and the process for one or both parties. Disputants should always be 
informed of the limitations and implications of the different ADR processes if both 
their interests and those of society are to be reconciled. 
C. Role Conflict 
There is no doubt that there are inherent conflicts within the structures of the two 
statutory bodies in providing alternative dispute resolution processes where there is 
no process choice. These are exacerbated further when disputants have little 
knowledge of the roles of the complaint officers to whom they complain. 
The most obvious conflict is that of the role of the impartial third party both 
investigating and then subsequently conciliating or mediating a complaint. 
In particular, the impartiality of a third party decision maker whose role 
changes between processes is likely to be severely diminished in that she or 
he is perceived to be both judge and jury. "A government official [the 
'
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investigator] cannot appropriately act without maintaining fidelity to the 
legal authority that both describes and constrains his power." 108 
Furthermore, it seems likely that "the needs of those who prompt the [investigation] 
will determine the types of facts they seek and the types of facts they find".109 
While not unresolvable, this perceived conflict could be problematic if the issue is 
not acknowledged. Once acknowledged however, the collection of facts by the 
investigator could result in the investigator using legal facts in a creative way in 
facilitating resolution of the complaint. 11 0 
Facts collected co-operatively are more useful in conflict resolution than those 
gathered separately because otherwise each party has a tendency to rigidly stick to 
· · l .c. d . · Ill its own part1cu ar 1acts an pos1t10n. 
It is also recognised that legal procedures or rules set limits on which facts are 
relevant to resolving a dispute. 112 If the investigator is required to explain how the 
facts that are collected satisfy the legal rules of the legislation under which they are 
working, the formality of the process is increased. The purpose for which the facts 
are collected in an investigation will therefore be quite different to the narrative 
collection of facts in a mediation process where the focus is on the disputants ' 
values and perceptions behind their competing claims. 
D. Fairness 
Concern has been expressed, particularly in Australia, about the lack of procedural 
.c.. . ADR 113 1airness m processes. Fairness, as with adjudication, is an important 
element of any ADR process but it should be remembered that fairness is more 
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likely to be achieved in processes where no final decision can be imposed on the 
d
. 114 1sputants. 
It is suggested that the lack of formal procedural rules appears to increase the risk 
of prejudice within ADR processes. This view is supported by studies which 
indicate that people holding prejudicial attitudes may act on those in informal 
settings because there are no external constraints (rules of evidence or procedure) to 
control any bias....... However, this is a possibility rather than a certainty or real 
likelihood. 11 5 
Informality also appears to exacerbate power differentials between disputants 
because the weaker or disadvantaged party ' s bargaining power cannot be 
compensated for, with the result that the dispute is unlikely to be resolved fairly. 
Delgado suggests that bias can be reduced by setting procedural boundaries, 
ensurmg that the third party facilitator is acceptable to both disputants and 
requiring identification of the ADR situations in which prejudice is greatest. 11 6 
One must, however, first identify what is meant by "fairness" . Albin identifies four 
types of fairness: structural, process, procedural and outcome fairness. 117 In terms 
of public and private interests, both substantive and procedural fairness ought to be 
considered. 118 The issue it seems "is not whether but how [ fairness has] an impact" 
, • · 119 m negotiat10ns. 
Procedural fairness relates to specific mechanisms used in reaching agreements and 
the actual features of ADR processes such as reciprocity and integrative 
procedures. In integrative negotiations, differing concepts of fairness become part 
of the bargaining process - " [t]air processes or procedures do not always lead to 
114 
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solutions viewed as fair nor does outcome fairness necessarily result from process 
.:-. . ,, 120 1a1rness . 
In mediation, procedural fairness can be evaluated by looking at mediator 
impartiality, the voluntary decisions of the disputants, disputants' understandings 
of the dispute, power imbalances, non-coercive negotiations and disclosure of 
information. Substantive fairness relates to the outcome of the mediation and 
content of any subsequent agreement. Agreement rates are certainly cited as 
institutional measures of success and fairness is typically assumed but this may 
overlook other factors which are equally important for equitable and fair treatment 
of disputants involved in mediation. 121 
One of the other factors which should be taken into account is the agreement itself. 
If the content of the agreement is fair it should produce compliance.122 If a 
disputant does not believe that the agreement is fair then he or she will not comply. 
Evidence to date suggests that mediated agreements provide more compliance and 
stability long term than adjudicated decisions. 123 Compliance as an indicator of 
fairness, is therefore also a valuable measurement when considering the interests of 
b h d. d . 124 ot 1sputants an society. 
E. Confidentiality 
It is said that the confidentiality attached to mediation "fosters an atmosphere of 
trust essential to mediation". 125 The difficulty is that public display and recognition 
of outcomes are often necessary before any social or legislative reform occurs. 126 
This immediately creates tension in terms of reconciling the public and private 
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interests of certain disputes particularly those involving discrimination or sexual 
harassment. In particular, mediation or conciliation of cases under the Human 
Rights Act 1993 are conducted in private and on a confidential basis on the grounds 
that this encourages frank and open interaction and negotiation between the 
disputants. There is no subsequent publicity of what transpired at the mediation or 
disclosure in terms of the settlement, unless publication is negotiated as part of the 
settlement. 
Mediation is usually conducted on a "without prejudice" basis which prevents the 
disputants using information leading up to the mediated settlement in subsequent 
forums such as court proceedings. Any privilege attached to the interparty 
communications may be waived by disputants if they agree to do so, either in 
whole or part. As a matter of law, disclosure might be required in some instances 
particularly when mediation is conducted by a statutory body. 127 
There are particular privileges attached to the mediation process. First, there is a 
privilege that protects communications made during the mediation itself. Secondly, 
there is a privilege in respect of the mediator which protects him or her from 
subsequently being required to testify. 128 The rationale behind these privileges lies 
in the maintenance of the integrity of the mediation process itself. 
It is, however, questionable whether or not the New Zealand courts would uphold a 
contractual term relating to confidentiality in mediated agreements on the grounds 
that, in some circumstances, the term could be "void as against public policy". 129 
Furthermore, other enactments such as the Official Information Act 1982 may 
compel production of documentation and/or information within the knowledge of 
the third party. 
127 Official Information Act 1982; see also n71, s 129 where disclosure of certain matters is not 
required; s95. 
128 Above n71, SS 130(2), 130(4); SS 96(2), 96(4). 
149 Abovenl25,451. 
36 
Even if confidentiality is protected by Statute, there are two exceptions to the 
statutory privileges accorded mediation. Those exceptions relate to actions 
concerning obligations or duties of care to bargain in good faith 130 and actions to 
enforce a mediation agreement which has been breached. 
Regardless of those exceptions, the requirement for confidentiality in ADR 
processes has the potential to undermine the public policy interest of certain cases 
and may also diminish confidence in voluntary mediation within a statutory 
framework. It does this because the privatisation of public interests that are 
perceived to be of value can result in both reduced equity and future access for 
others. 131 
Durbach is of the view that "the use of mediation poses the risk of invisibility and 
important community interests and tenuous rights hard won 'could fade from the 
public agenda'". 132 She provides an example of the long running Australian sex 
discrimination case which was finally settled in 1994. In that case the High Court 
had, in 1989, dismissed the appeal and held that Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd's 
("AIS") employment practices amounted to both unlawful direct and indirect 
discrimination. It was a case which, she said, "demonstrated the inefficiency of 
sex-segregated workforces and the need for flexible job structures based on 
merit" 133 and which led to changes in practices and attitudes to women in the 
workforce. 
In the interim period between 1980, when the first complaints were lodged, and 
1989, the Anti-Discrimination Board also received a further 700 other complaints 
which were eventually settled by mediation in May 1993. While the mediation 
provided complainants with long overdue financial compensation it did not allow 
for public disclosure of the global settlement figure nor the criteria relied upon for 
130 Above nl25, 452-453; above n71 , s 130(2); s96(2). 
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calculating damages.
134 
This, according to Durbach, gave rise to further distortion 
and speculation because the confidentiality terms agreed upon in settling the matter 
ensured control of information and protection of AIS from the public and 
135 shareholders. The women, the subject of the mediated complaints, were also 
particularly disadvantaged in that they entered into the mediation at an advanced 
stage of the discrimination dispute having little or no knowledge of the previous 
events. As a result, they had little ability to shape either the form or outcome of the 
mediation which effectively eroded the earlier gains and social justice accorded by 
the Court - "[a]s the women lost control of the dispute and its resolution, their 
capacity to advance the public interest diminished". 136 In effect, the confidentiality 
of the mediation appears to have sabotaged any further social reform. 
It is the issue of public access to which I now tum in considering whether private 
and public interests might be reconciled in terms of negotiated settlements under 
consumer protection laws. 
A recent New Zealand Human Rights Commission's opinion is a case in point. 137 
In that case the Commission formed an opinion that a senior female manager in a 
commercial organisation had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex 
because the organisation did not promote her to a newly created management 
position. Discrimination occurred because of a high level of subjectivity utilised in 
the respondent company's appointment process. This fact was supported by 
evidence of other women's experiences in management in that organisation, who 
believed that they had not been promoted within the organisation on the basis of 
their sex. 
Unfortunately, the private settlement that resulted curtailed any likelihood of the 
case having precedent value in educating others or encouraging social reform. 
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Without public scrutiny and awareness of that case, it is doubtful whether the 
settlement actually resulted in any modification to the respondent organisation's 
promotion or recruitment practices. It would have been desirable, but the privatised 
nature of the settlement means that it is unlikely that even the employees of the 
organisation itself would know of that opinion. 
How then can the private and public interests be reconciled so that the appropriate 
balance can be achieved particularly in cases where public interests ought to over-
ride the interests of individual complainants? 
The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1993 may have helped a little in this 
respect. Complaints can now be pursued by way of class actions.138 The Act 
effectively provides for group actions and if, as a matter of policy, subsequent 
publication of respondents' names was a term of any negotiated settlements arising 
from mediation or conciliation then this would, I believe, go some way to resolving 
the issue. 
Until such time as confidentiality of the terms of negotiated settlements are given 
statutory protection the publication of respondent names is at least a possibility. 139 
It may also assist complainants to feel that 'real ' justice has been achieved. It is 
clear that this would be a powerful tool against discrimination and other wrongs to 
which minority groups or the less powerful are subjected. 140 If this does not occur 
then mediation of some cases may well not be the most appropriate resolution 
process to satisfy the civil justice goal of rights protection and public and private 
interests will continue to be difficult to reconcile under the respective legislative 
framework. 
A distinction should, however, be made concemmg confidentiality, both in 
mediation and conciliation, as it relates to the process of mediation or conciliation 
and to the terms of negotiated settlements. While confidentiality in terms of the 
138 
Human Rights Act 1993, s83(2). 
139 The Privacy Commissioner already does this by way of case notes. 
140 
Above n126, 77. 
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integrity of the process is crucial, the same is not necessarily true for confidentiality 
undertakings in settlement agreements, particularly if there are over-riding public 
interests in having the issues exposed as would be the case with some 
discrimination cases. 
Certainly, confidentiality during the mediation process leading to an agreement "is 
a critical requirement for a consensual system". 141 However, it is suggested that 
any "agreement which might result ... could be publicly available at the discretion 
of the parties or as dictated by the nature of the enforcement process".142 
While the common law 'without prejudice' privilege protection appears to end 
when a settlement is reached that privilege may in time be qualified by either the 
Court 143 or the Tribunal. 
In the meantime, the Human Right Commission and Privacy Commissioner do 
from time to time influence conciliated settlements by ensuring respondents agree 
to certain settlement terms such as implementing new policies or practice 
improvements, although their statutory powers to do so may be questionable. 144 
One also wonders whether Parliament in enacting the Human Rights Act 1993 and 
Privacy Act 1993 ever intended that mediated or conciliated settlement terms not 
be publicly available, given the objects of the legislation to further social reform. 
In this respect, I note that a number of American States have prov1s10ns 
guaranteeing public access to certain kinds of State Commission proceedings or 
relevant information deemed within the public interest. 145 In my view, there seems 
no reason why similar solutions should not be possible on the same basis in New 
Zealand. Other solutions could include publication of emerging trends or practices 
141 
Above n 114, 72. 
142 
Above n 114, 72. 
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Above n65, 283 . 
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either by way of the Annual Reports or in more general publications. While case 
notes on significant opinions are currently published by the Privacy Commissioner 
and the Human Rights Commission in Brookers' publication "Human Rights Law 
and Practice" I suspect that, in reality, access to both is generally limited to those 
practising or working in the areas. This rather limits the potential educative 
function that each statutory body has and confines settlement outcomes to the 
"shadow of the law". What is meant by this expression? 
V SETTLEMENT OUTCOMES 
A. Active Choice in Negotiated Settlements 
It is said that ADR assisted negotiations between disputants operate "in the shadow 
of the law".
146 This is true in part, in that if disputants choose to settle their 
disputes utilising the ADR processes available to them and as a result, decide to 
make no public record of the terms of the settlement, the public will be none the 
wiser. However, this is an active choice made by the disputants themselves, the 
terms of which may be outside the framework of the law. 
Bargaining in the shadow of the law is described by Mnookin as being a process 
whereby the parties work out their own legally enforceable arrangement - a process 
of private ordering. 147 Mnookin suggests that negotiated outcomes are affected by 
parties' preferences, entitlements created by the law, transactional costs, attitudes 
towards risks and strategic behaviour.
148 The parties do not bargain in a vacuum 
but in the shadow of the law in that the "range of negotiated outcomes would be 
limited to those that leave both [parties] as well off as they would be in the absence 
of a bargain". 149 This infers that it is possible for parties to negotiate an outcome 
146 PS Adler "Casting Sunshine on Negotiated Settlements" ( 1990) 6 Neg Jn! 305, 306. 
147 RH Mnookin and L Kornhauser "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce" 
(1979) 88 Yale LJ 950. 
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which may well be better than that imposed by a court. However, parties are 
seldom aware of what information or criteria a court might rely upon in making its 
decision and accordingly, this is unlikely to be the sole determining factor. 
The question often asked is why negotiated settlements should be shielded from 
public scrutiny. In permitting private settlements, public institutions, which exist 
to uphold the protection of individual rights under the law for everyone, create a 
two-tiered justice system by encouraging people to hide behind the curtain of 
confidentiality. However, this is also true of settlements within the adjudication 
system. So why is there such a fuss about negotiated settlements under ADR? 
No doubt it is because the settlement can take place outside of the legal framework 
and does not rely on legal rules to uphold public norms and values. Certainly, 
traditionally, public norms and values have been clarified through precedent 
evolving through the courts. However, this is not to say that clarification of public 
norms and values cannot be achieved through informal processes in other forums 
through the utilisation of community norms. In other words, through private 
ordering of society. Is there any real harm to the public interest? 
It is submitted that while there is no obligation on parties involved in civil actions 
to make public their settlements under the adjudication system, why should public 
institutions endorsing ADR, such as the Human Rights Commission and office of 
the Privacy Commissioner, be any different? 
At the end of the day it is the disputants' choice as to how the dispute might best be 
resolved and for some, the value of ADR and in particular mediation, which assists 
disputants to channel conflicts constructively and prevent future conflicts from 
arising 150 may be more worthwhile in terms of the public interest than any public 
disclosure of the terms of a settlement or agreement. In effect, the private 
settlement may in fact serve public ends. This takes us back to the philosophy of 
150 Aboven77, 14. 
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the transformative approach of mediation which encourages both empowerment 
and recognition as central objectives. 
B. Empowerment and Recognition 
The word "empowerment" has become a buzz word especially in discourse 
concerning democracy in recent years. But with ADR, its analysis relates to the 
individual and to the community or social order. 
151 In terms of individuals it means 
self-esteem, increased autonomy in decision making and personal responsibility 
and awareness as a form of rehabilitation. Community or social empowerment 
involves legitimising disadvantaged groups' control over their lives and developing 
norms and values for resolving disputes so that the collective community is 
rehabilitated as a whole. 
152 
It is argued that the concept of empowerment is illusionary in that the shift from 
"rights" to "relationships" ultimately disempowers individuals and communities 
because it extends State control over both.
153 However, empowerment does not 
necessarily have to involve a shift at all. It actually involves taking responsibility 
for one's choices, goals, skills, resources and decision making. 
Empowerment, in mediation, has been defined conceptually in general terms as 
being achieved when disputing parties experience a strengthened awareness of their 
own self-worth and their ability to deal with whatever difficulties they face, 
regardless of external constraints. 
154 Empowerment is not, therefore, dependent on 
outcome. 
15 I S Cobb "Empowerment and Mediation: A Narrative Perspective" (1993) 9 Neg Jnl 245. 
152 Above n 151, 246. 
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In mediation, in particular, empowerment is not about balancing power between the 
disputants, controlling or influencing the mediation process or about the mediator 
becoming advocate, counsellor or adviser to the disputants.
155 
Recognition, on the other hand, is linked to empowerment in that it is a voluntary 
acknowledgment and awareness by one disputant of the other's perspective
156 by 
considering and giving recognition to the other in the form of thought, words and 
actions.
157 "It is the decision of the party to expand his focus from self alone to 
include the other that represents the moral growth expressed in giving 
. . ,,158 
recogmt10n. 
Like empowerment, the meaning of recognition is not one of reconciliation nor 
self-awareness but of "letting go -... one's focus on self and becoming interested in 
the perspective of the other party as such, ... not as an instrument for fulfilling one's 
d 
,, 159 
own nee s . 
Mediators, in using the transformative approach, are able to clarify points in the 
mediation where choices can be made by the disputants which both empower them 
and provide opportunities to give recognition to each other. 
160 This is achieved by 
interpreting, translating and reframing disputants' narratives to help the other's 
understanding rather than organising issues and solutions as done with the problem-
I . h 161 so vmg approac . 
For these reasons, transformative mediation does far more than simply assist 
private settlement between the disputants. That is why the focus on outcome or 
settlement does little to further the objectives of the Human Rights Act 1993 and 
155 Above n64, 96. 
156 Above n64, 85. 
157 Above n64, 89-92. 
158 Above n64, 93. 
159 Above n64, 97. 
160 Above n64, 100. 
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the Privacy Act 1993. In this respect, I now consider the limitations of such a 
focus. 
C. Output Driven Settlement Rates 
ADR is frequently judged by its settlement rates in terms of its success, but this 
informs us little about the measurement of success or what constitutes a successful 
resolution of a dispute under consumer protection laws. 
The obsession with settlement rates and outcomes appears to be worthy of some 
discussion to understand why private interests of disputants and public interests of 
society appear difficult to reconcile. Edwards suggests that "the mere resolution of 
a dispute is not proof that the public interest has been served". 
162 
Negotiated settlements should not only reflect outcome percentages but should also 
include resolutions in which the disputants may not have reached any final 
agreement. Procedural justice research indicates that "process may be as important 
to people as the outcome" in the successful resolution of a dispute. 
163 
Piss suggests that "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and 
should be neither encouraged or praised". 
164 He is of the view that settlement is no 
substitute for judgment even though it may appear to be a perfect substitute because 
it can declare the parties' rights. 
165 Moreover, officials within legislative branches 
of the law are required to interpret the values embodied in Statutes and that duty is 
not discharged when the matter is settled - " when the parties settle, society gets 
less than what appears". 166
 In essence, it is said that the parties simply secure 
peace. Even if settlement avoids an opinion, this does not necessarily mean that 
justice has not been secured. 
162 Above n74, 677-678. 
163 FEA Sander "The Obsession with Settlement Rates" (1995) 11 Neg Jn! 329, 330. 
164 OM Fiss "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1073, 1075. 
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On the contrary, user satisfaction research indicates that disputants value mediation 
and are likely to share similar perceptions of the outcome which helps reinforce 
attitudes of obligation and voluntary compliance thereby promoting social 
coherence and lower conflict. 167 Some people are satisfied by simply gomg 
through a process and in this respect, any ADR process might suffice. 168 However, 
in terms of the outcome, there may in fact be little difference in settlement rates 
between ADR and adjudication. User satisfaction seems to have more to do with 
therapeutic value than justice 'per se' so rates of settlement may be meaningless to 
measure. 
Another criticism of focusing on settlement rates as a measure of success is that 
settlements may reflect the power imbalance between disputants and therefore, 
simply maintain the status quo. In reality, it would appear that only a relatively few 
cases do actually reach the Complaints Review Tribunal and those cases generally 
involve matters of fundamental principle or outright denial of the alleged events. 
Accordingly, we can assume that generally ADR assists disputants in reaching a 
resolution of some sort. The aim must be to ensure the quality of the processes and 
acceptance that justice may not be achieved by "uncritical celebration of settlement 
.. . . Settlement is not the answer; it is the question".
169 
How then can ADR within a statutory framework satisfy the public interest under 
consumer protection laws? In the first instance, I believe it would do well to avoid 
what is described as the "centripetal pull of bureaucratisation which, ... can result in 
a rigidity of approach, as well as a privileging of efficiency and number-crunching 
l 't ,, 170 over qua 1 y . 
167 
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Institutionalising ADR can foster norms appropriate for specialist areas of 
mediation under anti-discrimination legislation by according full effect to the 
particularity of each case. ADR and settlement, if it eventuates, does not reduce the 
social function of the legislation to one of simply resolving private disputes but 
instead "calls on substantive community values".171 Justice and the law are not 
172 synonymous: 
Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not efficiency in government; it is not 
the reduction of violence: Justice is what we discover -.. . when we walk together, 
listen together, ... in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes 
from . ... Justice is the way one defines a righteous life; justice does involve 
according other persons their due ... 
Why then is there a perceived dilemma in regulating ADR? 
D. Dilemma of Regulating ADR 
The Honourable Justice Kirby believes that there is an "imperative need to found 
the future development of mediation ( ... and ADR generally) upon a sound 
theoretical basis" and that this must be based on sound empirical information. 173 
This proposition 1s particularly applicable to ADR processes provided within 
statutory frameworks under consun1er protection laws where the good intentions of 
Parliament have not necessarily been considered either in terms of the underlying 
philosophy of the use of ADR in such contexts or in terms of jurisdictional 
principles concerning process choice. Despite Parliament's endorsement and 
recognition of ADR, the perceived dilemma of regulating ADR must surely be the 
distinction between dispute settlement and the resolution of conflict. 174 This 
distinction becomes blurred when there are no unified definitions of the dispute 
171 
172 
173 
174 
AW McThenia, TL Shaffer "For Reconciliation" (1985) 94 Yale LJ 1660, 1664. 
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resolution processes available and creates specific problems when applied to ADR 
processes within a statutory framework. 
The primary problem with statute-based ADR is that it is constrained by the legal 
framework so that its capacity for flexibility can be limited and its processes 
become more formalised and mainstreamed. 175 This means that legal boundaries 
and rules tend to control the use of ADR processes. By introducing legal concepts 
such as the rules of natural justice the disputants end up in a system focused on 
outcomes which is not dissimilar to that of adjudication. Thornton makes a similar 
. 176 pomt: 
The fact that conciliation is conducted by a state agency renders inevitable the 
paramountcy of bureaucratic values; that is, the focus is directed towards 
efficiency measured by the number of complaints resolved .... 
The conjunction of the bureaucratic prescript of efficiency and the political need 
to produce results by means of 'resolved' complaints constantly militates against 
tackling the entrenched manifestations of institutionalised discrimination. 
The emphasis on mediation as case management of complaints, rather than actively 
using mediation as a process of reconciliation, undermines the potential 
effectiveness mediation may have in bringing about social reform. The conclusion 
one can draw from this is that both the Human Rights Commission and office of 
the Privacy Commissioner simply function as an adjunct to the courts in ensuring 
disputes concerning rights are settled instead of providing an alternative process for 
resolution of conflict. The alternative focus on reconciliation, rather than 
resolution as prescribed by legal norms, is a different function entirely and 
complements the other more formal processes provided. 
At the same time, traditionally disempowered complainants appear to find 
conciliation, at least, personally more satisfying than a formal court process. 
175 
176 
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Despite the positive and practical individual benefits derived from conciliation and 
mediation the "absence of consensus as to what are the primary goals of 
conciliation [ or mediation] highlights the difficulties involved in the evaluative 
t k" 177 as . 
It is argued that ADR represents procedural reforms and "should not swallow 
substance". 178 But it is the focus on substance and negotiated settlements within 
statutory frameworks which creates the dilemma in reconciling both private and 
public interests. 
If conflict management is the underlying philosophy of ADR provisions under 
consumer protection laws then ADR may well achieve private reconciliation that 
resolves a dispute efficiently and internally through a system of private ordering. If 
conciliation and mediation are utilised by informal institutions to satisfy social 
justice then the underlying aim will be one of fostering social relations. In this 
respect, it is likely that both private and public interests will be able to be 
reconciled because both are paramount to resolution of the conflict. 
Alternatively, if the underlying philosophy of ADR is to ensure disputes are settled 
and individual complainants achieve satisfaction by results that advance their 
substantive rights, not possible in a formal system of adjudication, then private and 
public interests are likely to be difficult to reconcile due to both the individualised 
and privatised nature of the settlement of that dispute. 
Mediation, whether or not any resolution results can, it is submitted, transform 
individuals, organisations, systems and our society. Indeed, it may offer more than 
individual conflict resolution and certainly need not result in compromise, 179 as we 
understand it, so long as it is an open process free from legal constraints. The 
transformative model in particular permits change either in respect of the parties, or 
177 Above n 176, 759. 
178 Above n77, 3 I. 
179 Above n85, 225. 
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the dispute, through communications made in the mediation process. 180 Menkel-
Meadow states: 181 
... mediation is transformative because it is educational. At its best, we learn 
about other people, other ways to conceptualize problems, ways to tum crises into 
opportunities, creative new ways to resolve complex issues and interact with each 
other. And we learn about ourselves and, perhaps, new ways to negotiate our next 
problem. But mediation has not solved racial and class inequalities in the world ... 
Mediation cannot transform all people-... 
The perceived dilemma of regulating ADR can also be diminished if jurisdictional 
principles for process choice are acknowledged in the selection of the process. In 
this way, the problem identified by Edwards, namely that if non-legal values are to 
resolve disputes then there is a need for substantive expertise, can be nullified.182 
He states that "the ADR movement often seeks to replace issue-orientated dispute 
resolution mechanisms with more generic mechanisms without considering the 
. f b . . ,, 183 1 d h h 1 f importance o su stantive expertise . He also cone u es t at t e goa o ADR 
must be to provide equal justice for all. 
In doing so, Edwards fails to acknowledge that equal justice for all may come in 
many different guises one of which might be social justice based on community 
norms and values. Moreover, information that comes to light during the course of a 
particular dispute may have widespread value and ramifications even if not in a 
legal sense. ADR processes can and do affect substantive law in an indirect way in 
that disputing itself is merely another form of decision making.184 
So what are the other dilemmas of regulating ADR aside from increasing 
formalism and emphasising substantive outcomes? 
180 Above n85, 229. 
181 Above n85, 240. 
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Probably the dilemma of most concern is the multi-roles of the complaints officers 
who are expected to be all things to all people. The aim of complaints officers in 
relation to most complaints is to ensure respondents compensate complainants and 
agree to comply with the law, particularly after an opinion has been formed that the 
law has been breached. Mulcahy states: 185 
Conciliators are set a difficult task that requires skill in mediation, an ability to 
control the process and a capacity for empathy and perception. All of this takes 
place in the context of a backlog of complaints and a shortage of staff, with 
complaints on the increase. 
Different complaints officers naturally will apply different methods to similar fact 
situations and Thornton suggests that conciliators are provided with little guidance 
as to how the conciliation process ought to be conducted. 186 Although these 
officers are responsible for both investigatory and conciliatory functions it is 
always with an "eye to settlement", stating "[t]he immunity from scrutiny therefore 
means that the success of conciliation is largely dependent on the good graces of 
particular agencies and their individual conciliators". 187 
In the absence of any direction or accountability under respective consumer 
legislation, it is evident why public and private interests may be perceived to be 
non-reconcilable in that the approach taken may not always reflect the philosophy 
underlying the use of ADR, even if the statutory body has one. 
Furthermore, complaints officers can have "altruistic desire(s) to contribute to the 
realisation of the legislative aims". 188 If that is the case then complaint officers will 
exercise an approach which facilitates resolution of complaints in a manner that 
endorses his or her preconceived norms and which will be contrary to the 
185 Above n 175, 28. 
186 Above n178, 747. 
187 Above n 178, 748. 
188 Above n 178, 750. 
51 
therapeutic transformative approach that is assumed to compromise a "non-partisan 
stance". 189 
There are also inherent contradictions with the conciliation procedure itself because 
while it purports to be a more "caring" process it actually operates to reinforce the 
. f h d . . . 190 mterest o t e ommant m society. 
Even if conciliation does reduce the public benefits that could otherwise be derived 
from a more transparent legal process it nonetheless "represents a potentially 
subversive challenge to legal formalism" and mediation, in particular, may usurp 
the "abstract cloak enshrouding formalism" by exposing the structures which 
1 , , d , 191 eg1t1mate state ommance. 
VI CONCLUSION 
What then is the answer, namely: can public and private interests in respect of 
negotiated settlements under consumer protection laws be reconciled? 
The answer, I believe, is that private and public interests can be reconciled under 
consumer protection laws but this does not necessarily appear to be the case at 
present under the Human Rights Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 1993. 
It is submitted the the reconcilation of both public and private interests will require 
a concerted effort by the two statutory bodies concerned. First, the statutory bodies 
will need to evaluate the underlying philosophy behind the differing ADR 
provisions within the statutory frameworks. By identifying the philosophy behind 
ADR the distinction between dispute settlement and conflict resolution will become 
189 Above n 178, 752. 
190 Above n 178, 758. 
191 Above n 178, 761. 
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quite clear. Negotiated settlements are "not an 'alternative' process, separate from 
adjudication, but [are] intimately and inseparably entwined with it". 192 
In comparison, resolution of the conflict through reconciliation in mediation may 
involve no outcome in substantive terms. That must be the choice of disputants 
and should not be dictated either by the statutory body or complaints officer. 
Secondly, those statutory bodies must adopt jurisdictional principles for process 
choice founded on the goals of the civil justice system itself. It will then be up to 
the disputants to choose, on the basis of jurisdictional principles, which process 
best reflects the goals they wish to achieve. 
Furthermore, the role of the statutory bodies in terms of both ongoing conflict 
together with the relevance of the outcome of such conflict for the disputants, 
should be dictated by "insight into the origins, context, life history, and 
consequences of the conflict - insight that can only be obtained from the 
. . ,, 193 part1c1pants . 
The goals that the disputants seek in any given dispute will vary considerably 
despite the subject matter of the dispute being constrained by the parameters of the 
legal framework. For some disputants the goal of social justice or human relations 
may be of more importance than the vindication of their individual rights which are 
alleged to have been breached. If that is the case then it seems probable that there 
will be "a continuity to disputing that may not be terminated even by a formal 
decision" . 194 In such a case, the recognition of a consensual mediation process 
should serve as a complementary but separate system within the statutory 
framework. 195 Murray suggests: 196 
192 M Galanter "The Quality of Settlements" 1988 Jnl Dispute Resolution 55, 82. 
193 WLF Felstiner, RL Abel, A Sarat "The Emergence And Transformation Of Disputes: Naming, 
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... the establishment of [a] consensual process should not obscure the 
interrelationship that must exist between such a process and the systems for 
settling disputes within society. A consensual dispute processing institution 
should be part of a comprehensive and phased system of settlement assistance 
made available to disputants. 
Indeed, the scope of any conflict is likely to be influenced by both the objectives 
and behaviour of disputants and also "by the processual characteristics of disputant 
institutions". 197 In this respect, the two statutory bodies must acknowledge that 
disputants' objectives may change along the way.198 While initial goals of civil 
justice determine jurisdictional principles for process choice, so too may the 
processes chosen subsequently alter the objectives of disputants. 199 The continual 
evaluation of options ensures that even if the dispute was to be individualised by 
choosing a more formal ADR process it may still have an important political 
dimension. Felstiner states:200 
Ultimately, what we are concerned with is the capacity of people to respond to 
trouble, problems, and injustice. We believe that the study of dispute processing 
has been too removed from the actual difficulties and choices that accompany the 
recognition that one' s life is troubled... . Recognition and action may not be 
appropriate or desirable in every instance . ... [H]owever, .. . a healthy social order is 
one that minimizes barriers inhibiting the emergence of ... disputes and preventing 
their translation into claims for redress. 
Accordingly, when community norms and values are accepted as being part of the 
realisation of some of the goals of civil justice, which are important for disputants 
in the exercise of jurisdictional principles, the process chosen will be recognised as 
a legitimate alternative to settlement. Private and public interests can then be 
reconciled, even if there is a private settlement, because the disputing process will 
serve public ends. ADR is much more than a settlement device and, mediation 
specifically, could be used more widely to assist to "organize individuals and 
197 
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199 
200 
Above nl93 , 643. 
Above nl93 , 642. 
Above nl93 , 643 . 
Above nl93 , 653. 
54 
strengthen communities of interest".201 Once this occurs disputes can be viewed as 
social constructs in terms of the politics of consensus building.202 
It is suggested that we must challenge the pattern of practice of mediation with its 
present emphasis on "problem-solving and settlements over other goals of social 
justice, promotion of equality or the improvement of human character".203 
In this regard, it is submitted that statutory bodies such as the Human Rights 
Commission and the Privacy Commissioner should, in future, take a more client-
centred approach which is both individually designed and executed204 if they are to 
reconcile the private interests of complainants with the public interests of our 
. Fl . 2~ society. emmg states: 
ADR is not a substitute for the courts, nor should it be. ADR is not even a single 
idea applicable to all kinds of situations. At its best, it is a congeries of ideas for 
encouraging disputants to play a greater role in settling their differences, for 
providing greater flexibility in processing their claims, and for doing so in a less 
complex, less costly, and less time-consuming manner. ... [T]he success of ADR 
will depend heavily on its ability to continually evaluate its own work, and to 
change its outlook in order to adapt to new conditions. 
It is submitted that only by adopting such an approach will private and public 
interests in respect of negotiated settlements under consumer protection laws be 
effectively reconciled. 
201 
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